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Abstract
This paper proposes a signaling model of fiscal
stabilizations that offers a new perspective on why
governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing. In our model,
dependable - but not fully credible - governments have an
incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling
effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a
sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At
this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing in order to
avoid being mimicked by weak governments. We show that a
testable prediction of our model is that primary balances and
debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating
function and we successfully test it on Irish, Belgian, and
Danish data from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
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1. Introduction
1
Since the early 1980s, several European countries have
adopted fiscal consolidation programs aimed at stabilizing
their public debt-to-GDP ratios. This policy was dictated by
the need to reassure the markets that the fiscal regime was
sustainable and avoid otherwise constantly increasing risk
premia and debt financing costs. In turn, the success of the
fiscal tightening and its cost depended critically on the
speed at which credibility was regained.  This interplay
between fiscal variables and interest rates is the focus of
the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper.  The
theoretical part of the paper consists of a signaling model of
fiscal policy, whereas the empirical part focuses on the
experience of Italy, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark from the
late 1970s to the early 1990s.
The analytics of debt sustainability is well known. A
country will have a sustainable fiscal regime if current and
future primary balances, interest rates and growth rates are
such that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is
satisfied.
2  Whereas the mathematics is unambiguous, policy
prescriptions are not.  The key difficulty is that all
relevant variables are endogenous, so that the feedback
effects of a fiscal package on growth-sensitive revenues and
expenditures, as well as interest rates, are crucial to
determine whether the measures taken are sufficient to
stabilize the fiscal regime. At the same time, shocks to
growth rates and interest rates affect the propensity of the
government to initiate fiscal consolidation.
                    
1 We would like to thank two referees for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper. This paper does not necessarily reflect the
views of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the Bank
of Italy. We also thank Maria Pia Mingarini for editorial assistance.
2 See, for example, Spaventa (1987).8
Whereas several recent papers have discussed the
endogenous link between fiscal consolidation and growth,
3 our
paper focuses on that between fiscal consolidation and the
credit rating component of interest rates.  Modeling the
endogenous link between fiscal variables and the credit
standing provides an insight into which fiscal variables
signal debt sustainability (the primary balance, as we will
see).
Our study is also related to the literature on the
determinants of large public debts and on the deviations from
the "tax smoothing" theory of the government budget (Barro,
1979). We propose a different explanation of why fiscal
stabilizations are often delayed, that could be considered
complementary to those recently surveyed by Alesina and
Perotti (1995b) which are mainly based on the distributional
consequences of fiscal adjustment
4 and on the strategic use of
government debt.
5
This paper links the timing of a fiscal correction to
the credit standing and the debt level of a country.  In our
framework, a fiscal stabilization may be delayed if risk
premia and debt levels are below a critical threshold so that
no government has any incentive to tighten the fiscal regime:
in this range, both dependable and weak policy makers choose
                    
3 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995), for example, argue that there are
instances in which a fiscal correction can be expansionary rather
than contractionary.  Their work is complemented by Alesina and
Perotti (1995a, 1997), who point out that a fiscal tightening needs
to cut expenditure items such as transfer programs and public
employment to be expansionary.
4 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that the difficulty of identifying
ex-ante individual gainers and losers from a reform could generate a
bias toward the status quo.  Similarly, Alesina and Drazen (1991)
argue that a war of attrition between different social groups
determines the timing of stabilization. In a related paper, Drazen
and Grilli (1993) show that economic crises may have positive welfare
effects when they prompt a fiscal stabilization.
5 Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) show
that policy makers may accumulate strategically government debt to
constrain the actions of their successors.9
to run primary deficits and build up the debt stock. Only when
risk premia or debt levels exceed this critical threshold do
interest payments become so large that dependable governments
prefer to run primary surpluses, thus signaling the
sustainability of the fiscal regime. Differently from other
papers in this literature,
6 we endogenously derive the
threshold triggering a fiscal stabilization as a function of
the reputation and preferences of the government. Moreover,
when we allow for endogenous debt accumulation (Appendix 4),
we find a novel strategic role for government debt. We show
that the optimal policy of governments that are dependable -
but not fully credible -  is to accumulate strategically a
critical amount of debt that allows them to signal. In this
case, there is only one equilibrium in which the dependable
government first runs primary deficits and then deviates from
optimal tax smoothing to signal its type.
An interesting case study is the Italian fiscal
stabilization of the early 1990s. Figure 1 (top panel) shows
Italy's country rating against the time profile of primary
balances.
7 Although the rating improved somewhat during the
1980s when primary deficits were being reduced, it dropped
considerably in the early 1990s when primary surpluses were
about to be achieved and has only partially recovered since
mid 1996. This evidence raises a number of questions: Is this
                    
6 The existing literature often sets the trigger levels for the timing
of stabilization exogenously. Bertola and Drazen (1993), for example,
derive a nonlinear relationship between private consumption and
government spending with government spending falling whenever it
reaches exogenously given target points.  An exogenous trigger level
of government debt is also assumed in Sutherland (1995).
7 The country rating is that published twice a year by Institutional
Investor.  Unfortunately, this rating is available only since the
second semester of 1979.  The country ratings of Institutional
Investor are based on information provided by leading international
banks. Bankers are asked to grade each of the countries on a scale of
zero to 100, with 100 representing those with the least chance of
default. The sample ranges from 75 to 100 banks. Banks are not
permitted to rate their home countries. Individual responses are
weighted by Institutional Investor using a formula that gives more
importance to responses from banks "with greater worldwide exposure
and more sophisticated country-analysis systems".10
seemingly non-monotonic relationship between ratings and
primary balances an Italian peculiarity or is it common also
in other instances of fiscal stabilization? Can economic
theory account for the observed behavior of credit ratings,
primary balances, and debt stocks? And, finally, when should
we expect Italian ratings to return to the level of the late
1980s?
To answer these questions, we first study the behavior
of credit ratings, primary balances, and debt stocks during
the Irish, Belgian, and Danish stabilizations of the mid
1980s. Figure 2 shows that the Italian case is not unique: in
Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark, we find the same non-monotonic
relationship between primary balances and credit ratings that
we noted in Italy. In the late 1970s, these three countries
enjoyed high ratings -  the highest in the sample -  despite
sizeable primary deficits. As primary balances started
improving in the early 1980s, ratings rapidly deteriorated.
Only when primary surpluses were achieved in the mid 1980s did
the ratings begin to recover. This evidence not only confirms
the non-monotonic relationship between credit ratings and
primary balances, noted for Italy, but also suggests that
primary surpluses might have a signaling role.
Figure 3 sheds some light on the causes of the observed
non-monotonic relationship by linking the evolution of credit
ratings to that of debt-to-GDP ratios. The low debt stock of
all three countries in the late 1970s -  the lowest in the
sample -  seems to account for the high ratings enjoyed in
those years, notwithstanding the primary deficits. When the
debt stock rapidly increased in the early 1980s, possibly
reflecting higher real world interest rates, as well as
disinflationary monetary policies, the credit ratings
deteriorated because investors did not know whether the
primary balance would improve enough to make the fiscal regime
sustainable. Figure 3 also shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio
alone cannot fully account for the time-series behavior of11
ratings that began to recover after the achievement of primary
surpluses, although debt-to-GDP ratios were still rising.
8
In our view, the stylized facts of Figures 1-3 suggest
that a bivariate analysis of the data might be misleading and
that both debt stocks and primary balances concur to determine
the credit rating of a country. This is also the first
prediction of our theoretical model. The second prediction is
that primary balances have a signaling role at high debt
levels.  This is indeed the original claim of our paper and,
as discussed below, it distinguishes our model with endogenous
uncertainty on the type of government in power from more
conventional models with exogenous uncertainty. The testable
implication is that debt stocks and primary balances not only
concur to determine the credit rating of a country -  as
predicted also by models with exogenous uncertainty -  but
they are complementary inputs in the credit rating function
until signaling is completed.
9 We present econometric tests of
this complementarity hypothesis below, but Figures 2 and 3
already provide a first indication of its validity. In
Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark, primary balances seem to have a
greater effect on credit ratings when the debt stock is high
and when the primary balance is about to swing from a deficit
into surplus. This greater signaling power beyond a certain
debt threshold can explain both the sudden deterioration of
ratings at the beginning of the signaling phase, when there
are still primary deficits, and their improvement after the
achievement of a surplus, notwithstanding the high debt stock.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the theoretical model, justifies its key assumptions and links
                    
8 The fact that the debt still keeps on rising when primary balances
improve is not surprising, as its dynamics depends also on the spread
between interest and growth rates, which widened in the presignaling
period because credit ratings dropped and real interest rates
increased.
9 We are indebted to a referee for suggesting this interpretation of
our model.12
it to the relevant economic literature. Section 3, after
discussing how to derive testable implications from our
stylized signaling model, presents econometric estimates based
on Irish, Belgian, and Danish data, that confirm the
predictions of the model. Section 4 debates possible
alternative explanations of the empirical evidence. Section 5
concludes.
2.  The theoretical model
Our model has the basic features of a class of
signaling models used to study monetary policy signals.  As in
Barro (1986), we assume that there are two possible types of
policy makers with identical preferences but different ability
to precommit their policies. One policy maker is dependable
and can precommit not to default on the outstanding stock of
debt whereas the other cannot. Initially, investors do not
know with certainty which policy maker they are facing,
although they believe with positive probability that he is
dependable. As fiscal policies are implemented, they then
revise this prior probability. When the debt is low, neither
type of policy maker is seen as being in danger of defaulting
and primary deficits prevail until dependable governments
start tightening fiscal policy to contain debt accumulation.
As this critical time approaches, risk premia emerge because
the public fears that a weak policy maker-if in power-might
stop mimicking the policies of the dependable policy maker and
default. Risk premia disappear only when the public observes
policies that only a dependable policy maker would implement.
This sequence of equilibria implies a non-monotonic
relationship between risk premia and primary balances like the
one observed in the data. At low levels of government debt,
pooling equilibria prevail and no policy maker is expected to
default so that primary deficits are associated with high13
ratings. Conversely, at high levels of debt, separating
equilibria emerge with dependable governments achieving
primary surpluses and weak governments defaulting. When the
debt stock reaches a critical threshold - which is a function
of the reputation and preferences of the government -  a shift
from pooling to separating equilibria takes place and credit
ratings drop. The model also predicts that primary surpluses
have a signaling role because only dependable governments
would achieve them without defaulting.
2.1  The setup
We consider a three-date, two-period model. At time
zero, the government issues a given stock of one-period debt
1 D
10 and the public sets the interest factor  1 R  that will be
paid in the following period. At time one, the government pays
back  1 1 1 1 D R    ( ) -q  -where  1 q  is the fraction of debt defaulted,
11
spends g, levies distortionary taxes  1 t  and rolls over a stock
of debt  2 D  to the last period, on which the public sets an
interest factor  2 R .
12 At time two, the government pays back
2 2 2 1 D R    ( ) -q  and levies distortionary taxes  2 t . The resulting
government's budget constraints are:
                    
10  At this stage, we can assume that the revenues from issuing D1  are
"put in the ground". In Appendix 4, we relax this assumption by
modeling the government’s problem at time zero of optimally choosing
D1, together with taxes, t0, and expenditure, g0.
11 In this paper, we do not interpret default as inflating away the real
debt value because it would not be consistent with our credit risk
measure.  In a framework that allowed for default through inflation,
the maturity of the debt would play a role (see, for example, Calvo
and Guidotti, 1990, for a model with exogenous uncertainty, and Drudi
and Prati, 1995, for a signaling model with endogenous uncertainty).
12 As noted below, the government can issue a positive stock of debt at
time 1 only when default does not occur. Therefore, in equilibrium,
the two actions of issuing new debt and defaulting on the outstanding
stock of debt are incompatible.14
(1) 1 1 1 1 D R g D       +     =     +   1 ( ) 2 - q t
(2) 2 2 2 1 D R       =   2 ( ) - q t
We assume that within each period the government moves
first so that the timing of the game is:
13
                                  1                           
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2 t  are distortionary costs of taxation and a g are the
benfits of government expediture. In Appendix 1, we show that
minimizing (3) is equivalent to maximizing the welfare of an
economy populated by risk-neutral agents.
After plugging the budget constraints into the
objective function, the optimal policy of the government is
the solution of the problem:
(4) [ ] [ ] g D Min D R ( ) g D D R   g , , , 1 1 1 2 ( ) $
2 1 2
2 2
2 2 2 1 1 q q q q a      
1
2
  +  
1
2
    -  
  - + - -
                    
13 The results of the paper would be analogous if the government's and
the public's actions were simultaneous within each period. By
contrast, an opposite timing with the public moving first would cause
a multiplicity of equilibria.15
where  $ a    is the ratio of the marginal benefit of government
expenditure a  to the parameter h of the quadratic function of
distortionary costs of taxation.
Finally, we assume that two types of government might
be in charge. Type D ("dependable") can precommit not to
default and always chooses  t
D q   =  0, whereas type W ("weak")
cannot precommit and chooses either  1 1
W q =    or   2 1
W q = , depending
on his incentives to mimic type D policies in period one.
At time zero, the public does not know with certainty
which government is in charge, but it believes with
probability 1-   0 p  that the government is type D. In the rest
of the paper, we will loosely refer to the prior probability
as "initial reputation". At time one, the public will observe
the policies implemented by the government in charge and
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where all probabilities are conditional on the type of
government and  1 1 $ , $ q t  and  $ g  are the observed policies.
As we show in Appendix 1, under the additional
assumptions of risk neutrality and zero risk-free interest
rate, investors will set interest factors according to the no-
arbitrage condition:
(6) t t
e R    (1  -     = 1 q )16
where  t
e q  is the default rate expected by investors.
14
2.2  The equilibria
We investigate perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure
strategies. Two types of equilibria may prevail: separating
equilibria or pooling equilibria. In the first, the government
W chooses  1
W q   =  1 and reveals itself at time one. In the
second, type W mimics type D policies at time one and reveals
its type only in the last period by choosing  2
W q   =  1. Note that
we use subscripts to refer to time and, when needed,
superscripts to indicate equilibria (S for separating and P
for pooling) and types (D for dependable and W for weak).
In the absence of uncertainty, type W would be unable
to issue any debt at time zero because the public would
anticipate its incentive to default at time one. By contrast,
in the game of incomplete information considered in this
paper, the uncertainty about the government in power allows
type W to issue debt until uncertainty is resolved. This can
happen at time one or two. Type W will reveal its type in
period one (separating equilibria) when the cost of imitating
type D policies is larger than the benefit of issuing debt
between period one and period two. Type W will reveal its type
in period two (pooling equilibria) when the opposite is true.
                    
14 The game studied in this paper is part of a general class of dynamic
games with a large player (the government) and a large number of
small players. The play of the large players is observed and is
therefore part of the public history of the game, while the
individual plays of the small players are not observed, so that only
their aggregate play is part of the public history of the game.
Similar games in an infinite horizon context are in Chari and Kehoe
(1990, 1993), Stokey (1991).17
As we will see, this tradeoff is crucially affected by:
the marginal benefits of expenditure (the higher is the
parameter a , the greater is the expenditure that type W would
like to finance in period one and the greater are the benefits
of issuing debt between periods one and two), the marginal
cost of taxation (the higher is the parameter h, the lower are
the taxes that type W is willing to levy in period one and the
higher the cost of imitating type D policy), the initial stock
of debt (the higher is  1 D , the higher are the taxes that type
D levies in period one and the higher the cost of imitating
its policy), and the initial reputation (the higher is  1 D ,
the smaller are the risk premia and the higher are the
incentives to mimic type D policies).
In Appendix 2, we formally derive the equilibria. In
this section, we state the main results in two propositions
and provide the intuition behind them. First, consider
separating equilibria. In this case, at time one, type W
reveals its type by defaulting on the outstanding stock of
debt. There are two possible cases. In the first, type W is
unwilling to mimic type D policy of choosing optimally at the
margin the level of expenditure and taxation. In the second,
as type W would imitate type D optimal level of expenditure at
the margin, type D chooses to cut expenditure below its
optimal separating equilibrium level not to be confused with
type W. Type D will choose this second signaling strategy only
if the benefits of paying lower interest payments after
signaling outweigh the cost of cutting expenditure below its
optimal level. Evidently, the poorer is the initial reputation
of the government, the higher are interest rate premia and the
stronger are the incentives to signal. The following
proposition specifies the range of parameters in which each
case of separating equilibrium exists.18
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S 1   <      <   $ 1 a , type D runs a primary budget
surplus in period one (Table 1 shows equilibrium strategies
and interest rates).
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2 1 £ + - a  type D runs a
primary budget surplus in period one (Table 1 shows
equilibrium strategies and interest rates).
Proof: see Appendix 2 for the proof.
The amount of debt maturing in period one determines
the relevant case. In Case I, the debt plus interest maturing
in period one is large enough  ( >    )  1 $ D R
S
1 a  to make type D run a
primary surplus by choosing an expenditure level 
S D , g $ ( ) <a
smaller than the smoothed level of taxation 
S D S D , , $ (   ) t t a 1 2 = = .
This policy allows the public to distinguish type D from type
W, which prefers a higher expenditure level 
S D S W g g
, , $ (   ) = = 2 a . In
Case II, the debt plus interest maturing in period one is so
small  (    )  1 $ D R
S
1 £ a , that, if type D followed the optimal
separating equilibrium tax and expenditure policies of Case I,
it would run a primary deficit by choosing an expenditure
level  ( >    )  1
S D g
, $ a  larger than the smoothed level of taxation
S D S D , , $ (   ) t t a 1 2 = = . However, this tax and expenditure level would
make the separating equilibrium unsustainable because type W
would mimic such large expenditure. To avoid a breakdown of
the separating equilibrium, as long as the debt plus interest
maturing in period one is small but not too small19
$











< £ , type D deviates from the optimal -
but unsustainable - Case I policies. To prevent mimicking,
type D runs a balanced period one primary budget rather than
the primary deficit implied by Case I policies: expenditure is
lower  ( =    )  1
S D g
, $ a  and period one taxes remain higher than period
two taxes 
S D S D , , $ (   > ) t a t 1 2 =  with a deviation from perfect tax
smoothing.
In separating equilibria, type W repudiates the debt in
period one  ( =   )  1 1
S W , q  so that the interest paid between period
zero and period one includes a risk premium  ( =  1 )  1
S R , which is
a function of the government's initial reputation  (1  =   )  0 p .
After separation, type W faces an infinite interest rate and
does not issue any debt, whereas type D is able to issue debt
at the risk-free interest rate.
Proposition 2: Pooling equilibria exist in the range
    < 1 ( ( ) ) $ D R R R
P P P
2 2 2
2 1 + - a .
In pooling equilibria all governments run a primary
budget deficit in period one (Table 3 shows equilibrium
strategies and interest rates).
Proof: See Appendix 2 for the proof.
In pooling equilibria, the debt stock issued in period





P P P <
+ -
$
( ( ) )
a
 to make type D willing
to be mimicked in period one, as type D considers the marginal
benefits of expenditure larger than the interest cost of being
confused with type W. In pooling equilibria, type D runs a20
primary deficit in period one and chooses an expenditure large
enough 
P,D g (  ) > $ a  to make type W imitate it together with all
other type D policies in period one. As a consequence, type W
defaults only in period two  ( =   = 0   1 1
P W P S , , q q  and   = )  2 1
P W , q  and the
government pays the risk-free rate   = )  1 1
P R (  on the debt
maturing in period one.
Figure 4 shows the parameter ranges in which each type
of equilibrium exists. Initial reputation  ( - )  1 0 p  is on the
horizontal axis, whereas the ratio of the marginal benefits of





 is on the vertical
axis. Pooling equilibria exist in an area in the top right-





is associated with a small risk premium (a high   - )  1 0 p . As we
move toward the center of the box, the initial stock of debt
and the risk premia increase, and separating equilibria (Case
I and Case II) prevail.
Multiple equilibria are possible in an intermediate
range where there is an overlapping of the ranges in which
pooling and Case II separating equilibria exist. In this area,
if investors choose the risk-free rate in period zero  ( -1)  1
P R ,
then the best response of both governments is to play their
pooling equilibrium strategies; if investors instead choose
the interest rate associated with separating equilibrium
 ( >1)  1
S R , then the best response of both governments is to play
their Case II separating equilibrium strategies. The fact that
in the multiplicity area both types of policy maker prefer
pooling equilibria (see Appendix 3) suggests that if investors
could coordinate their expectations, they would demand the21
risk-free rate in period zero and make pooling equilibria
prevail. This would, indeed, be their optimal strategy given
that both governments are ultimately trying to maximize the
utility of the investors (see Appendix 1). However, since
investors are atomistic, they may not coordinate their
expectations on the risk-free rate and may well demand the
higher rates associated with separating equilibria.
15 As a
result, in the range of parameters where multiple equilibria
exist, investors could force an early - but sub-optimal -
resolution of uncertainty by failing to coordinate their
expectations on the risk-free rate. In the extension of
Appendix 4, the multiplicity of equilibria disappears because
we show that in Case II separating equilibria the optimal
strategy of type D is to choose a level of D1 that is not in
the multiplicity range.
2.3  Key assumptions and extensions
This section is devoted to discussing how we could
relax some simplifying assumptions of the model presented
above without affecting its main predictions. We also discuss
how our modeling strategy differs from others used in the
literature.
A first issue is whether our results depend critically
on the two-period structure of the model. This issue is taken
up in Appendix 4, where we add one period to the model by
allowing the government to choose at time zero the optimal
level of debt, D1, taxes,  0 t ,  0 g , and expenditure,  0 g . This
extension has the advantage of making the evolution of the
                    
15  The equilibrium refinement of Pareto Dominance (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1992, pp. 18-23) could rule out separating equilibria but its
application requires players to be able to coordinate their actions.22
debt-to-GDP ratio endogenous and with it the timing of the
switch from pooling to separating equilibria.
16 In addition,
it drastically simplifies the results of the model. In the
three-period model, there is only one possible equilibrium in
which the economy switches from a pooling equilibrium in
period zero to a Case II separating equilibrium in period one.
The main results of the two-period version are confirmed with
the pooling in period zero being associated with a primary
deficit and the separating in period one with a balanced
primary budget. The key difference is that in the three-period
model type D is allowed to choose D1 optimally and eliminate
welfare-inferior equilibria.
17
Alternatively, to model a shift of equilibria strictly
within the limits of a two-period model, we could have
introduced exogenous shocks affecting the initial debt-to-GDP
ratio, D1, at time zero before R1 is determined. As long as
the shocks hitting D1 do not push it beyond the critical
threshold derived in Section 2, pooling equilibria prevail.
But when a large enough positive shock hits D1, dependable
governments are forced to signal and a switch to separating
equilibria takes place. Given that higher real interest rates
(a risk-free factor greater than one) would lead ceteris
paribus to a faster rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio, it is easy
to find an empirical counterpart for such shocks in the
experience of Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark in the early
                    
16 By contrast, the two-period model of Section 2 only allows the
conjecture that, in an extension with more periods, the shift from
pooling to separating equilibria would ultimately take place, given
that the debt stock is growing in pooling equilibria  2 1
P D D ( ) > , and
that separating equilibria prevail when the debt exceeds a certain
threshold.
17 The other possible equilibria considered in Appendix 4 are the
following: pooling in period zero with switch to Case I separating in
period one, pooling in period zero, one, separating in period zero,
one.23
1980s. In those years, the higher real interest rates
prevailing worldwide and the tightening of the monetary policy
regime associated with the creation of the EMS are likely to
have made Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark switch from pooling to
separating equilibria. As real interest rates increased, the
debt dynamics and the sustainability of the fiscal regime
worsened, making dependable governments, after an initial drop
in credit ratings, switch to primary surpluses and signal
their types.
A second issue is whether our assumption that type D
can precommit its policies is justified. This assumption has
been made in a number of papers that use game theoretical
models to study monetary policy signals.
18 As Cukierman and
Liviatan (1991) pointed out, an alternative to this approach
is to assume, as in Vickers (1986), that there are two types
of policy makers with different preferences and that the
public is initially uncertain about which of the two is in
power. The latter was indeed the approach we first took in
this paper (see Drudi and Prati, 1993), but we subsequently
adopted the precommitment assumption to simplify the
exposition of the results. In that model, different
redistributive preferences - not different precommitting
ability - characterized the two types of policy maker. Type D
was a government sufficiently "right-wing" (i.e., one for
which the weight of the utility of bondholders in the social
welfare function was sufficiently larger than in the
population) to be willing ex-post to repay the debt. This
larger weight on the utility of the bondholders solved the
time-inconsistency problem and prevented the government from
defaulting on the outstanding debt. By contrast, in that
framework, type W was a government sufficiently "left-wing"
                    
18 See Barro (1986), Persson and Tabellini (1990, Ch. 3-4) for a review
of the literature.24
not to be willing ex-post to repay the entire stock of debt
outstanding.
Only two insights of the previous model are lost in the
simplified version of this paper. First, because this paper
characterizes type D as always willing to repay the debt no
matter how large interest payments are, crisis equilibria in
which no debt can be issued are impossible. By contrast, these
existed in the earlier model whenever the probability of the
"left-wing" government being in power was high enough to
generate risk premia so high that even a "right-wing"
government would repudiate. Second, because this paper
characterizes type W as unable to precommit, its optimal
repudiation rate is always q    =  1 t , whereas in the previous
version, a partial repudiation with 0<q t  <  1 was possible
whenever the redistributive preferences of the "left-wing"
government were not too extreme.
A third issue is whether a model with a continuum of
types would yield different results. As it is difficult to
imagine a continuum of types with varying degrees of
precommitment ability, this extension is meaningful only in
relation to a model with policy makers with different
(redistributive) preferences. In this case, as policies are
implemented, investors would update their prior probability
that certain types are in power. As a result, signaling would
no longer be instantaneous and credit ratings would change
continuously once a signaling phase has begun.
Another feature of our model is that the weak
government always defaults on the outstanding stock of debt.
In this respect, this paper is different from Drudi and
Giordano (1995), where the government defaults because of an
exogenous shock to real interest rates, or Alesina, Prati and25
Tabellini (1990), where it defaults because of a self-
fulfilling confidence crisis, whose likelihood depends on the
maturity structure of the debt (see also Cole and Kehoe,
1996b). We could allow for exogenous uncertainty (for example,
on the risk-free rate) and have type W - and perhaps also type
D - default only in certain states of the world, but this
would only complicate the model without adding any additional
insights. Note that the fact that in our model a weak
government always defaults does not prevent this type of
government from issuing debt, as long as investors do not know
- because of incomplete information - that the weak type is in
power. Only when uncertainty is resolved will the weak
government face the traditional time-inconsistency problem and
be unable to issue any debt.
The advantage of this setup is that we do not need to
assume exogenous costs of default, as is often done in the
literature, in order to have equilibria with a positive debt
stock. Nevertheless, default is costly, because a weak
government cannot issue new debt and finance its desired
amount of expenditure after a default. It is important to note
that this is not a "punishment" or a trigger strategy
necessary to support equilibria with a positive debt stock, as
in Grossman-Van Huyck (1988) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
but rather the sequentially rational strategy of all agents
once default has occurred, as in Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993).
Of course, the cost of being excluded from borrowing after
default is very much taken into account by the weak government
to determine when it is optimal to stop mimicking the policies
of the dependable government.
Some papers in the literature on sovereign lending
study signaling models with features that resemble those of
our paper, but none fully models the fiscal decision of the26
government and, as a consequence, characterizes the
equilibrium path of the debt stock, the primary balances and
the interest rates as we do here. Cole and Kehoe (1996a), for
example, study a model where the "honest" government type
always honors a debt contract because failing to do so would
reduce its utility by a large exogenous amount.  While their
"honest" type is somewhat similar to our "dependable" type,
they model the debt financing decision as exogenously
determined by whether the economy is in an even or an odd
period, so that the outstanding debt is either fully repaid or
fully defaulted and no discussion of the optimal amount of
debt to roll over is possible. In addition, given the
different focus of their paper, they do not study signaling
strategies that the "honest" one may follow to separate from
the "normal" one. Detragiache (1989) considers a signaling
model with two types of government characterized by different
discount factors rather than by their ability to precommit
their policies. As a result, in Detragiache's model the
difference in the discount rates of the two borrowers
determines whether pooling or separating equilibria prevail.
Other papers modeling sovereign lending with imperfect
information are Kletzer (1989), Atkeson (1991), and Cole, Dow
and English (1995).
3.  An econometric test of the signaling model
3.1 Testable implications of the signaling model
Figure 4 summarizes the key predictions of our model.
When the debt stock is small and initial reputation is high
(top right-hand corner), primary deficits -  associated with
pooling equilibria -  prevail and ratings remain high because
no government is expected to default. As the debt stock27
increases,
19 primary deficits decline and, when dependable
governments are about to switch to primary surpluses and
signal, credit ratings drop (intermediate area of the box).
Only when primary surpluses are consolidated do credit ratings
improve. This implies that a testable prediction of our model
is that ratings (RATE) are negatively related to the debt-to-
GDP ratio (DY) and positively related to the primary balance-
to-GDP ratio (PY). If our model holds, we should then be able
to estimate a rating function:
(7) RATE =   f  DY, PY   ( )
with  f  < 0  DY  and  f  > 0  PY , where  f i    indicates the derivative
with respect to the ith argument.
However, our model with endogenous uncertainty on the
type of the policy maker is not the only one to predict a
rating function of this type. A model with exogenous
uncertainty on real interest rates or public expenditure could
also generate very similar predictions.
20 With exogenous
uncertainty, investors fear a default not because a weak
policy maker might be in power (as in our model), but because
a large enough shock to interest rates or public expenditure
might hit the economy and force even a dependable government
to default. In this model, for a given distribution of shocks,
a default would be more likely the higher is the debt stock
and the bigger is the primary deficit. As a consequence, a
                    
19 As discussed in Section 2.3, the debt stock can increase either
because we assume that in the two-period model of  Section 2 the
initial debt stock D1 is subject to an exogenous shock or because it
evolves endogenously as predicted by the three-period extension of
Appendix 4.
20 There are several theoretical models that allow for exogenous
uncertainty.  See, for example, Missale, Giavazzi and Benigno (1997),
for the case of interest rate shocks, Calvo and Guidotti (1990), for
the case of public expenditure shocks.28
model with exogenous uncertainty would also predict that
ratings are a negative function of the debt stock and a
positive function of primary balances.
The above consideration implies that we need a sharper
prediction than  fDY<0 and fPY>0 to test the validity of our
model. Indeed, our model predicts that the signaling power of
primary balances (fPY) is not constant but varies with the
stock of debt. When the debt stock is low, pooling equilibria
prevail and fPY should be small because primary balances do
not signal the type of government in power. By contrast, when
the debt stock is high, separating equilibria prevail and fPY
should be large because primary balances have a signaling
role. Therefore, our signaling model predicts that fPY should
be greater than usual during a signaling phase, which is
associated with primary balances swinging into surplus.
21 Once
signaling has taken place, fPY may be expected to return to
its normal (presignaling) level.
In summary, the novel prediction of our model is that
PY and DY are complements in the rating function f(PY, DY),
i.e., fPY,DY>0.
22  Note that this is a prediction of the model
until signaling is completed. The most straightforward way to
test for complementarity would then be to create a sample that
includes both low-debt periods (like the 1970s) and high-debt
periods (like the 1980s). The postsignaling observations could
then be either ignored or treated similarly to those from low-
debt periods. This happens because, according to our model,
                    
21 A literal interpretation of our model would imply an instantaneous
signaling phase. In our estimates, we assume more realistically that
in a world in which governments change fiscal measures are often of a
one-off nature, signaling takes place over a few years, requiring
lasting primary surpluses. Alternatively, we would need a model with
a continuum of agents as discussed in Section 2.3.
22 We are indebted to a referee for suggesting this interpretation of
our model.29
once uncertainty is resolved, there is no reason to expect fPY
to remain larger than usual, even if the debt-to-GDP ratio
remains high. This consideration is important because we are
forced to include the postsignaling observations in our
sample. As ratings are available only since 1979.2, our sample
begins at the end of the 1970s and covers a period in which
the debt stock is high most of the time, with the only
exception being a few years at the very beginning of the
sample. To have enough observations, we need to include the
postsignaling period of the late 1980s-early 1990s
characterized by still high debt-to-GDP ratios but already
improved ratings. Therefore, we test the complementarity of PY
and DY by checking whether fPY is significantly larger in the
signaling phase than in the previous and following periods.
The signaling phase is defined for each country as the sub-
sample during which PY swings from a deficit into surplus.
The complementarity of PY and DY in the rating function
f(PY, DY) also implies that, if the government is dependable,
the primary balance will always increase when the debt
increases. The intuition is that the larger effects of the
fiscal tightening on the credit rating always make it more
profitable for the dependable government to tighten fiscal
policy when the debt stock is high. To test this prediction,
we check whether, in a regression of PY on DY, the estimated
coefficient is positive and significantly greater than zero.
Note that in this case a positive correlation between PY and
DY should also be expected in the postsignaling phase, because
a dependable government would continue to run primary
surpluses as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio remains high.30
3.2  An econometric test on Irish, Belgian, and Danish data
We test the predictions of our theoretical model on
time-series data for Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark (Figures 2
and 3).  We do not try to test them on Italian data (Figure
1), because the observations available for the signaling phase
are insufficient.
Data are semi-annual, with the primary balance-to-GDP
ratio (PY) obtained as a linear interpolation of annual
data.
23 The credit rating (RATE) is published by Institutional
Investor in March and September of each year and is available
since 1979.2. The debt-to-GDP ratio (DY) is the end-of-period
figure of June and December of each year. The samples are
1979.2-1995.1 for Ireland and Belgium and 1979.2-1992.1 for
Denmark.
24
The three variables RATE, PY, and DY can be considered
stationary. Although univariate stationarity tests (augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests) confirm the stationarity of all three
series only in Belgium, cointegration tests very strongly
reject the existence of less than three cointegrating vectors
for all countries (Appendix 5). Both the trace and the maximum
eigenvalue statistics (with or without the small sample
correction) yield the same result, no matter whether we use
one or two lags in the analysis. As the existence of a number
of cointegrating vectors equal to the number of variables used
                    
23  Infra-annual data on interest payments, needed to derive semi-annual
primary balances from the overall balances, were not available.
24 The Danish sample is shorter because of a break in the Danish fiscal
series.31
in the cointegration analysis implies that the three variables
are stationary,
25 we proceed under this assumption.
First, we test whether PY and DY are complements in the
rating function f(PY, DY) by checking whether the positive
effect of PY on RATE is stronger during the signaling phase
(see Section 3.1). The estimated equation is:
(8) RATE g g RATE g DY g PY g DSIG * PY t t 2 t-1 t-1 t-1 t   = + +            (   0 1 1 3 4 - + + + ˛ )  .
One lag of the dependent variable is included to
eliminate serial correlation of the residuals in the
regressions for Ireland and Belgium.
26 DY and PY are lagged
one period to avoid simultaneity bias.
27 DSIG is a dummy
variable equal to one during signaling phases and zero
otherwise. Signaling phases correspond to the periods in which
primary balances swing from deficit to surplus in each
country. We define them as the periods 1982.1-1988.1 in
Ireland, 1981.1-1989.1 in Belgium, and 1982.2-1986.1 in
Denmark.
Estimation results are summarized in Table 4. The
coefficients g2,g3 and g4 are all strongly significant and have
the expected signs. In the long run, an increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio of 10 percent is estimated to reduce the rating
                    
25 See, for example, page 276 of PcFiml 8.0 Manual. With a number of
cointegrating vectors equal to the number of variables we can choose
the three cointegrating vectors to be unit vectors (1 0 0), (0 1
0),(0 0 1) without restricting the cointegration space.
26 For Denmark, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable was not
statistically significant. Its inclusion among the regressors had
very little effect on the estimated coefficients of the variables of
interest.
27 We also estimated instrumental variable regressions with
contemporaneous DY, PY using lagged variables as instruments,
obtaining very similar results (available upon request).32
by 2.7 points in Ireland, 3.9 points in Belgium, and 1 point
in Denmark. In the long run, a 1 percent improvement in the
primary balance during a normal (nonsignaling) phase is
estimated to raise the rating by 0.9 points in Ireland, 3.0
points in Belgium, and 0.2 points in Denmark. A similar 1
percent improvement in the primary balance during a signaling
phase is estimated to have an additional long-run effect of
2.2 points in Ireland, 1.2 points in Belgium, and 0.3 points
in Denmark. This additional effect is strongly significant (at
a confidence level of 99 percent in Ireland and Denmark and 95
percent in Belgium).
Estimation results suggest two considerations. First,
the smaller estimated coefficients for Denmark probably depend
on the smaller variation of ratings in this country combined
with the larger range of variation of its primary balances
(see Figure 2). Second, in Belgium, the estimated additional
coefficient g4 for the signaling phase is smaller than the
estimated coefficient g3 for normal periods, whereas in
Ireland and Denmark we obtain the opposite result. This may
suggest a smaller signaling effect of primary surpluses in
Belgium due to their weaker response to increases in the debt-
to-GDP ratio. This interpretation is confirmed by the next set
of estimates.
As discussed in Section 3.1, if PY and DY are
complements in the rating function f(PY, DY), the primary
balance will always increase with the stock of debt when the
government is dependable. To test this implication, we
estimate the equation:
(9) PY L PY DY t t- t- t   =   + ( ) 0 1   1  2  1  g g g + + ˛  .33
Estimation results are reported in Table 5. A varying
number of lags of the dependent variable (two for Ireland and
Denmark, and three for Belgium) are needed to eliminate serial
correlation in the residuals. The estimated coefficient g 2 is
strongly significant and has the expected positive sign. In
the long-run, a 10 percent increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio
is estimated to increase the primary balance by 2.6 percent in
Ireland, 1.6 percent in Belgium, and 3.0 percent in Denmark.
The weaker response of the primary balance in Belgium is
consistent with the weaker signaling effects of the primary
balance estimated in Table 4.
4.  Alternative explanations of the empirical evidence
Are there alternative explanations that could account
equally well for the empirical evidence? As noted in Section
3.1, a signaling model is not the only model predicting that
credit ratings should decline with the debt stock and rise
with the primary balance. A model with exogenous shocks to
public expenditure or interest rates would have similar
implications. We have argued, however, that our model makes
the additional prediction that until signaling is completed
the debt stock and the primary balance should be complements
in the rating function. This implies that signaling should be
associated with high debt-to-GDP ratios and with the primary
balance swinging into surplus. In the previous section, we
successfully tested the prediction by showing that during
signaling phases the effect of an improvement in the primary
balance is bigger.
Another explanation of the deterioration in the credit
ratings of Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark in the early 1980s
could be based on the contagion effects of the Mexican debt34
crisis, which would have made holders of government debt aware
of the risks of their investments, inducing them to update
their priors on default.
28  We can easily account for this
alternative explanation in the framework of our model, because
a shock to the default priors would result in a switch from
pooling to separating equilibria. This can be verified by
looking at Figure 4 where a higher prior probability of
default could reduce 1-p0 enough to move the economy from a
pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium area. This
explanation of the evidence could complement those of Section
2.3 based on an endogenous evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio
(see Appendix 4) or an exogenous shock to the debt dynamics
due to higher real interest rates (in our model, a risk-free
factor greater than one). However, when we add the variable
RATE to the determinants of the primary balance in equation
(9), we find a statistically significant coefficient (with the
expected negative sign) only for Belgium.
Another alternative explanation of the empirical
evidence could be based on the assumption that investors are
uncertain about the state of the public finances rather than
the type of government.
29 In this context, the beginning of
fiscal consolidation may indicate that things are actually
worse than previously thought and credit ratings may drop if
consolidation is uncertain to succeed. Credit ratings would
then recover when uncertainty is eliminated. Although this
story is consistent with the observed correlations, such a
model needs to provide a rationale for the lack of
transparency of the public accounts. Specifically, one would
                    
28 This alternative explanation was suggested by one of the referees.
29 This alternative explanation was suggested by one of the referees. A
similar distinction exists in the corporate finance literature
between imperfect information on the type of firm or management and
imperfect information on the profitability of the project undertaken
by only one type of firm or management.35
need to explain why a government that knows that the public
finances are in good shape would not find it to be in its
interest to increase the transparency of its accounts and
eliminate risk premia paid as a result of this uncertainty.
30
In fact, if the optimal policy were to have transparent
accounts when the state of the public finances is good,
investors would know with certainty that lack of transparency
signals a bad state of public finances and the start of fiscal
consolidation would not send any additional negative signal.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a signaling model to explain
some stylized features of fiscal stabilization in Ireland,
Belgium, and Denmark during the 1980s and in Italy during the
early 1990s. The first prediction of our model is that credit
ratings should be positively related to the primary balance
and negatively related to the debt-to-GDP ratio. This explains
why even a country with large primary deficits will have a
high credit rating when the debt stock is small, and why that
country will need a primary surplus to obtain the same rating
when the debt stock is large. The intuition is that when the
debt stock is small all governments would run primary deficits
and no government would have any incentive to default, whereas
when the debt stock is large, dependable governments would run
primary surpluses to show that they are not of the weak
(defaulting) type.
However, other types of models could predict a rating
function positively related to primary balances and negatively
related with to debt stock. For example, models with exogenous
                    
30 Of course, the government itself may not know the state of the public
finances, but this seems unlikely.36
shocks to interest rates or government expenditure would
predict a similar rating function without any need to
introduce uncertainty on the type of government in power.  But
these models could not explain why the primary balance seems
to have a greater-than-usual effect on credit ratings when it
is about to swing from deficit into surplus (Figures 1, 2, and
3 and Table 4). This is the novel prediction of our model,
which implies that primary balances and debt-to-GDP ratios are
complementary inputs in the function determining the credit
rating. The positive effect of primary balances on credit
ratings increases with the debt-to-GDP ratio until primary
surpluses are achieved and the sustainability of the fiscal
regime is signaled. This happens because it is at high debt-
to-GDP ratios that the economy moves from a pooling to a
separating equilibrium with primary balances having strong
signaling power. Specifically, our model predicts that
signaling should take place when the primary balance swings
from deficit into surplus. We successfully test this
prediction on Irish, Belgian, and Danish data, although
further research is certainly needed to verify the predicted
signaling role of primary surpluses on a larger sample of
countries.
The results of this paper shed new light on the
determinants of large public debts and on the deviations from
the "tax smoothing" theory of the government budget. Our model
implies that even dependable governments find it optimal to
delay the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This happens
because they have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime
when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that
is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been
accumulated). Indeed, in Appendix 4 we show that when a
dependable -  but not fully credible -  government is allowed
to choose the initial stock of debt strategically, its optimal37
policy is to accumulate a debt stock large enough to determine
a switch from pooling to separating equilibria and signal its
type by deviating from optimal tax smoothing. In other words,
to obtain an early resolution of uncertainty, dependable
governments accelerate the dynamics of the debt stock and
seemingly delay stabilization to determine the signaling time
optimally. Although further analytical research is certainly
needed to check the robustness of this result in an infinite
horizon setting,  and possibly with a continuum of types, we
believe that our novel explanation of delayed stabilizations
may complement those based on distributional conflicts and on
the strategic accumulation of debt aimed at constraining the
actions of successive governments.
With regard to fiscal sustainability criteria, our
paper suggests that standard measures should be interpreted
with caution. On the one hand, as long as the debt stock is
relatively small, explosive paths of the debt-to-GDP ratio
with persistent primary deficits need not be a source of
concern because both dependable and weak governments would run
the same seemingly unsustainable policy. On the other hand,
when the debt stock is large, explosive debt paths with
persistent primary deficits are much more worrying because
they signal that the government in power is not dependable and
is likely to default.
Does this paper shed any light on the prospects for an
improvement in Italy's credit ratings? The experience of
Ireland, Belgium, and Denmark suggests not only that the
deterioration in Italian credit ratings at the beginning of
the 1990s is not surprising but also that, if Italian primary
surpluses persist, the ratings will ultimately improve.
Indeed, this has begun to happen since mid 1996. The only
remaining peculiarity of the Italian case seems to be the38
relatively slow response of the ratings to the considerable
primary surpluses of the early 1990s, although we certainly
need more observations on the signaling phase to verify that
this slower response is statistically significant. If
confirmed, the seemingly smaller signaling power of Italian
primary surpluses may -  at least in part -  be attributed to
the extreme political instability experienced by Italy in the
early 1990s and to the large share of one-off measures often
included in Italian fiscal packages. Both factors would, in
fact, tend to reduce the signaling effect of primary
surpluses.39
APPENDIX 1
An economy of risk-neutral agents
In this Appendix, we present a simple economy of risk-
neutral agents, whose welfare is maximized by a government
that solves problem (4) in Section 2.1 and whose optimal
policy is to set interest factors according to the no-
arbitrage condition (6). Agents are simultaneously consumers
and investors.
We assume that the economy is populated by a large
number of risk-neutral atomistic agents living for three
periods. For simplicity, we set the discount factor to one, so
that in period zero a representative agent maximizes the
expected utility function:
{ } U E c c c = + + 0 o 1 2  
where ct is consumption in each period (t=0, 1, and 2).
In period zero, agents do not work and allocate their
initial endowment e0 between consumption and government debt,
so that their aggregate budget constraint is:
c e D 0  = 0 1 - .
At time one and two, agents work and receive labor
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31  In both periods, the government may levy
                    
31 This form of distortionary costs is often used in the literature, it
is not particularly ad hoc. In fact, it is easy to show that by
modelling explicitly the labor supply decision of the agents with a
utility function separable in consumption, leisure, one would get
analogous first order conditions for the government problem.40
an ex-post tax on the maturing stock of debt plus interest,
t t t D R q  . In addition, at time one, government expenditure
increases private consumption by a factor a . Therefore, the
agents' budget constraints at time one and two are:
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It is easy to verify that maximizing the agents'
welfare U subject to the government's budget constraints
(equations (1) and (2) in Section 2.1) is equivalent to solve
problem (4). Moreover, the following no arbitrage condition
(identical to equation (6) in Section 2.1) is the solution of
the agents' maximization problem:
1 1 R t t
e ( )  =  1          = 1,2 - q
where  t
e q  is the expected tax rate on debt maturing in period
t, given the information set of agents in period t-1. Note
that the first-order condition of the private sector would be
identical, if we considered a small open economy with perfect
capital mobility and a risk and tax-free international asset.
Alternatively, we could have assumed a risk-free domestic
technology with a rate of return equal to one.41
APPENDIX 2
Propositions 1 and 2
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S < < $ a , type D runs a primary budget
surplus in period one (Table 1 shows equilibrium strategies
and interest rates).
Proof: We derive the optimal strategy of type W in a
separating equilibrium by solving problem (4) without
precommitment and under the assumption that at the end of time
one investors know that type W is in power:
(4.1)
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Solving backwards, the last period optimal strategy of
type W at time two is clearly to default on the entire stock
of debt outstanding by choosing:
2 2
S W S W , , q t   =  1                =  0.
However, given that in separating equilibrium,
investors perfectly anticipate the last period policy of type
W, they will not buy any debt at the end of time one, i.e.:
2 2
S W S W D R
, ,   =  0                =   . ¥42
This implies that, at the beginning of time one, type W
faces the problem:
(4.2) [ ] Min D R g   g S W S W 1 g
S W S W
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whose only solution is:
1 2
S W S W
1
S,W g
, , $ q t a   =  1                           =   =   .
We derive the optimal strategy of type D in a
separating equilibrium by solving problem(4) with
precommitment to zero default in both periods and under the
assumption that at the end of time one investors know that
type D is in power:
(4.3) [ ] [ ] Min D R g D D    g S D S D g D
S D S D S D S D S D
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Table 1 shows the optimal policy that solves this
problem. Note that, to have a positive g
S,D, we need to impose
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Given that the prior probability at time zero that type
W is in power is p0, the equilibrium strategy of risk-neutral
investors in separating equilibrium is to set the interest
factor on D1 at:
1 1 1
S W S D S R R R
p
, , = = =  
1
1- 0
and to set the one on D2 using Bayes' law:43
2 1 2 1 0 1 S D S D S W S W R is observed R is observed , , , , , = 1,  if   =            =   if     q q ¥ = .
Separating equilibria exist only if both type D and
type W have no incentive to deviate from the separating
equilibrium policies derived above. As long as type W does not
mimic type D policies, type D would never deviate from his
separating equilibrium strategy because this is optimal by
construction under the hypothesis of separation and because
any other strategy that confused him with type W would make
him worse off (by not allowing him to issue any debt in period
one and preventing tax smoothing). By contrast, to finance a
larger expenditure without levying more taxes, type W may
deviate from his separating equilibrium policies and mimic
type D policies at time one, causing a breakdown of the
separating equilibrium. In the deviation strategy, type W
mimics type D strategy at time one and defaults on the entire
stock of debt at time two.
32 To rule out such deviation, we
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where Ci
j  is the cost for type i (i = W or D) either in
equilibrium (j = S for separating and j = P for pooling) or in
the deviation from equilibrium (j = SDev for the deviation
from separating and j = PDev for the deviation from pooling).
It is easy to verify that the above inequality is satisfied
whenever 
S D s g D R
, $ $   <     or  1 1 a a > . The latter inequality provides
the upper limit for the range of parameters in which Case I
                    
32 As off-equilibrium beliefs, we assume that investors believe that
there is a zero probability of type W being in charge if they observe
q 1 0 = .44
separating equilibria exist and implies that these equilibria
are associated with primary surpluses.
Case II: for  1 1 1 1
2
1 1
2 1 D R D R R R
s S S S < < + - $ ( ) ( ( ) ) a , type D runs a
balanced primary budget in period one (Table 2 shows
equilibrium strategies and interest rates).
Proof: Case II separating equilibria may emerge in the range
of parameters in which the stock of debt maturing in period
one is so small,  1 1 D R
s £ $ a , that type W deviates from his Case I
separating equilibrium strategy making Case I equilibria not
viable. Case II separating equilibria will be possible in the
range  1 1 D R
s £ $ a  only if type D finds optimal to restore the
viability of a separating equilibrium by deviating from its
Case I strategy and implementing policies that type W does not
mimic.
The optimal strategy of type D solves the problem (4.3)
subject to the constraint that type W must be unwilling to
mimic, i.e.  W
SDev
W
S C C ‡ , where  W
SDev C  is now the cost for type W of
mimicking the optimal Case II strategy of type D. This
constraint amounts to a maximum level of expenditure for each














Type D problem in Case II can then be rewritten as the
following minimization problem in
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The unique real solution of this problem is  1
S D , $ t a =    ,
which implies a balanced primary budget in period one. Given
taxation, the other equilibrium values follow from the
constraint on g
S,D and the government budget constraints. Type
W equilibrium strategies are the same as in Case I.
Case II separating equilibria exist only if both type D
and type W have no incentive to deviate from the policies
derived above. Type W cannot deviate by construction.
Conversely, type D could deviate by reoptimizing at time one.
In the deviation, type D chooses a set of policies in period
one that do not allow the public to distinguish him from type
W because he reckons that the benefit of a higher expenditure
in period one more than compensates the cost of paying an
interest premium between period one and two.
33 Type D problem
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33  The off-equilibrium beliefs are the following: whenever investors
observe the deviation strategy of type D in the separating
equilibrium, they revert to the pooling pricing of bonds. This is
justified from the observation that it would be in the interest of
type W to mimic that policy in the deviation from separating
equilibria.46
To rule out the deviation of type D from Case II
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This inequality holds in a range whose limits are the
two values of  $ a s that solve the associated second order
equation. The lower limit can, however, be neglected because
it is outside the range of  $ a s is relevant for case II
( $) 1 1 D R
s £a . Therefore, after setting  1 1
SDev D S R R
p




conclude that Case II separating equilibria exist in the
range:
1 1 1 1
2
1 1
2 1 D R D R R R
s S S S £ < + - $ ( ) ( ( ) ) a .
Proposition 2: Pooling equilibria exist in the range 
1 2 2 2
2 1 D R R R
P P P ( ( ) ) $ - < a .
In pooling equilibria all governments run a primary
budget deficit in period one (Table 3 shows equilibrium
strategies and interest rates).
Proof: The optimal strategy of type W in pooling equilibrium
is to choose:
q t 2 2 1 0
P W P W , , = =                                       47
and to mimic type D optimal strategy in period one.
Given that in pooling equilibria type W defaults only
at time two, no revision of beliefs is possible at time one
and the equilibrium strategy of risk-neutral investors is to
set interest factors at:
1 1 2 2 2 1
P W P D P W P D P R R R R R
p






We derive the optimal strategy of type D in a pooling
equilibrium by solving problem (4) with precommitment to zero
default in both periods and under the assumption that
investors set interest factors as indicated above:
(4.6) [ ] [ ] Min D g D D R   g P D P D g D
P D P,D P,D P D P D
, , ,
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1
2
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+ - a
Table 3 shows the optimal policy that solves this
problem.
Pooling equilibria exist in a range of parameters in
which neither type W nor type D deviate from the above
equilibrium strategies. Type W does not deviate from the
pooling equilibrium strategy as long as type D runs a primary
deficit at time one:
P D P W P D P W g g
, , , , $ =   >   = = 1 1 t t a .
The intuition is that, if type D chose to run a primary
surplus by setting 
P D P D g
, , $   <   = 1 t a , type W would be better off48
defaulting on the outstanding stock of debt and running a
balanced budget by setting 
PDev W PDev W g
, , $   <   = . 1 t a
The primary deficit requirement can be obtained
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This inequality is satisfied for:
P D P D P P D g D R D D
, , , $ ( ) >            >      2 1 1 1 2
2 t a « > «
note that the inequality  $ ( ) a > 1 2
2 D R
P  is always satisfied in the
range of Proposition 2, which reflects the condition for no-
deviation of type D that we are about to derive.
Type D could deviate from its pooling equilibrium
strategy by reoptimizing at time one.  In the deviation, type
D chooses a set of policies in period one that distinguish him
from type W because he reckons that the benefit of paying a
risk-free interest rate between period one and two is larger
than the cost of cutting expenditure to a level that type W
would not mimic.
34 The optimal strategy of type D in the
deviation is the one that solves the problem (4.6) with
2 2
P D PDev D R R
, , =   1  = and subject to the constraint that type W must
                    
34 We assume that in the deviation off-equilibrium beliefs are such
that, if the optimal deviation policy of type D (derived below) is
observed, investors require the risk-free interest rate.49
not mimic. This constraint (analogous to the one derived above
in the proof of Proposition 1 for Case II separating
equilibria) amounts to a maximum level of expenditure for each
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Type D problem in the deviation from pooling can then
be rewritten as the following minimization problem in t1
PDev D , :
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The unique real solution of this problem is  1
PDev D , $ t a = ,
which implies  1
PDev D g
, $ =a  and a balanced primary budget in period
one.
To rule out the deviation of type D from pooling, we
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We conclude that pooling equilibria exist only in the
upper range because only in this one the condition  $ ) a > 1 2
2 D R
P  (
for the no-deviation of type W is satisfied.51
APPENDIX 3
Pareto dominance in multiplicity range
This appendix proves that in the multiplicity range
both type W and type D prefer pooling equilibria to Case II
separating equilibria.
Type W











2 2 2 $ $ $ $ , a a a a - g   
P W  <     -   .
This inequality is always satisfied in the multiplicity
range because in that range pooling equilibria exist and, to
prevent a deviation of type W from pooling, the inequality
g   
P W , $   >a  must hold (i.e., pooling equilibria exist only if
there is a primary deficit in period one, see proof of
Proposition 2 in Appendix 1).
Type D
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This inequality is always satisfied in the multiplicity
range because in that range pooling equilibria exist and, to




P C C >  must hold (see proof of Proposition 2 in
Appendix 1), but, given that  D
S
D




P C C >  holds.53
APPENDIX 4
A three-period model
In this Appendix, we add one period to the model of
Section 2 by allowing the government to choose at time zero
the optimal level of debt, D1, taxes, 0 t , and expenditure, g0.
The new government's budget constraints are:
(0) 0 0 1 g D = + t
(1') D R g D 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ( ) - + = + q t
(2) D R 2 2 2 2 1 ( ) - = q t .
The timing of the game becomes:
                        1                             
                         |                                      |           
, ,                  g , ,  ,                           , 0 1 1 1 2 2
Time 0 Time Time 2
g D R D R
› › › › ›
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problem (4) becomes:
(4')
Min g D D R g D
D R g g
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q q q
q a








- - + -
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Note that the model needs to be solved backwards to
insure sequential rationality.  This implies that the results
of Propositions 1 and 2 still characterize the possible54
equilibria of the game starting at time one for any given D1
and that we need to study how these equilibrium strategies for
periods one and two can be combined with the optimal strategy
in period zero. There are four types of possible equilibria:
(1) pooling in period one combined with pooling in period
zero; (2) Case I separating in period one combined with
pooling in period zero; (3) Case II separating in period one
combined with pooling in period zero; (4) separating in period
zero.
Proposition 3: In the three-period model, there is only one
equilibrium with type W and type D choosing Case II separating
equilibrium strategies in periods one and two (Table 3) and
































In this equilibrium, the primary budget is in deficit
in period zero (pooling) and is balanced in period one
(separating).
Proof: Our solution strategy is the following.  First, we
derive the optimal policies and the conditions for the
existence of each of the four possible equilibria.  Second, we
let type D choose the debt level, D1, that minimizes overall
costs.
(1) Pooling in period one combined with pooling in period zero
In this equilibrium, to find the optimal strategy of
type D at time zero, we let the government solve problem (4')
subject to the constraint on D1 in Table 3 and taking the55
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type D can choose any D1 in the specified range because, with
R1=1, g0 and g1 have the same marginal utility so that type D
can shift expenditure between period zero and period one by
varying D1 without affecting welfare. The LHS inequality on D1
follows from the optimal policy t a 0 =    $  combined with the non-
negativity requirement for g0, whereas the RHS inequality
follows from Proposition 2. A negative D1 implies that the
government accumulates assets between period zero and period
one that are then used to finance a larger g1. A negative D1
also implies that the government runs a primary surplus in
period zero to which it corresponds a larger primary deficit
in period one. This means that even though in a three-period
model primary surpluses at zero may be associated with pooling
equilibria, these surpluses are not lasting.56
The pooling-pooling equilibrium strategy will be viable
only if neither type W nor type D find optimal to deviate from
it. Type W will never deviate from it because the cost of not
mimicking type D policy  in period zero (and then adopt an
"autarchy" strategy in which he runs balanced budgets in
period zero and one by choosing  0 0 1 1 t t a = = = = g g $ ) is larger
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Type D will also never deviate from the pooling-pooling
strategy. To show it, we first need to find the primary
surplus at time zero at which type W prefers the "autarchy"
strategy and then show that type D always prefers the pooling-
pooling strategy to running such a large surplus at time zero.
To force type W into "autarchy", type D needs to choose a
larger than optimal level of taxes in period zero  0 t a >> $
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which is satisfied for any t a 0
2 1 2 > + $ ( )   . Type D will then
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which is always satisfied for any t a 0
2 1 2 > + $ ( )   . Note that in
the RHS of the above inequality we have arbitrarily chosen
D1=0. This can be done without loss of generality because D1=0
is in the pooling-pooling equilibrium range.
(2) Case I separating in period one combined with pooling in
period zero
In this equilibrium, to find the optimal strategy of
type D at time zero, we let the government solve problem (4')
subject to the constraint on D1 in Table 1 and taking the Case
I separating equilibrium strategies in period one and two of
Table 1 as given. We also rewrite problem (4') in terms of t 0
and D1:
(4'.2) Min D D R D
S
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the solution of this problem is:













Note that the solution for D1 is a corner solution
corresponding to the minimum D1 at which Case I separating
equilibria exist. This happens because the derivative of the
cost function (4'.2) with respect to D1 is always positive
implying that D1 should be chosen as small as possible. At
time zero, type W never deviates from this equilibrium because58
type D always runs a primary deficit. Also type D never
deviates because the following inequality always holds for:
t a
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(3) Case II separating in period one combined with pooling in
period zero
In this equilibrium, to find the optimal strategy of
type D at time zero, we let the government solve problem (4')
subject to the constraint on D1 in Table 2 and taking the Case
II separating equilibrium strategies in period one and two of
Table 2 as given:
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at time zero, type W never deviates from this equilibrium
because type D always runs a primary deficit.  Also type D
never deviates because the following inequality always holds
for t a 0
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(4) Separating in period zero
The separating equilibrium in period zero never exists
because type D will always prefer equilibria (1), (2), and (3)
above. This follows from the fact that the conditions for no
deviation of type D at time zero from such equilibria are
always satisfied.
Equilibrium selection
Type D chooses the D1 in period zero that corresponds
to the equilibrium that minimizes the overall cost. This is
equilibrium (3). The cost associated with equilibrium (3) is,
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Similarly, the cost associated with equilibrium (3) is
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